Maiwand 1880
This scenario first appeared in the Principles of War Magazine. My thanks to
John Hollyoak for sending it to me and giving permission for its
publication.
Over the past few years the Wargames Study Group of the Victorian Military Society have put on demonstration games at various venues to try to raise the profile of 19th Century Wargaming in general and the Victorian Military Society in particular. The choice of game has not been easy in that we have to choose a battle in which the natives have a reasonable chance of victory. We could just run a choreographed game but we prefer to actually run things on the day as long as there are enough people available. This year's game is Maiwand 1880 and this seemed an excellent choice for this issue as the army lists have been drawn up and the game has already been played using Principles of War. My thanks to John French for his research and permission to use the
same.
BACKGROUND
Britain was worried about the possibility of Russian influence in
Afghanistan posing a threat to the North-West Frontier and hence India itself. When British envoys were refused admission to Kabul it resulted in two British Divisions being sent to Afghanistan in late 1878. Victories over the regular Afghan army followed.
In February 1880 the 66th (Royal Berkshire) Regt. was sent to
Kandahar, an important trading centre some 300 miles south-west of Kabul. By July it was reported that a large Afghan army was marching from Herat district towards
Kandahar.
The 26th July saw an Afghan force in the vicinity of Maiwand, about 40 miles from
Kandahar. Burrows thought it was an advance party and did not know it was the entire Afghan army. This left Burrows with approximately 2,500 men, including one regiment of mainly new recruits, facing an army variously estimated at between 15 and 25,000. For the course of the resulting battle I refer to the reports of Brigadier General Burrows as appeared in The London Gazette of November 19th, 1880.
From Brigadier-General
G.R.S. Burrows, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Kandahar Force, - (Kandahar, 30th August, 1880).
I have the honour to report, that, on the 26th ultimo, whilst encamped at
Khusk-i-Nakhud, I received information that 2000 of the enemy's cavalry and a large number of ghazis had arrived at Garmao and Maiwand, and that it was Ayub Khan's intention to follow with the main body of his army immediately.
A sketch is attached to this report, showing the positions of Maiwand and
Kushk-i-Nakhud, from which it will be seen that to carry into effect the instructions I had received, viz., to prevent Ayub Khan from passing on to
Ghazni, it was incumbent on me to intercept him either at Maiwand or
Kushk-i-Nakhud.
Hitherto I had found it impossible to obtain any reliable information regarding Ayub Khan's intended movements, for, although when the expedition set out, it was understood that we were to operate in a friendly country, and in concert with a loyal army, the actual circumstances were the reverse of this. The Wali's army had gone over to the enemy; the Wali himself was a refugee in my camp. Whatever little political influence there may previously have been in the country, was at an end, and every man's hand was against us.
In the absence of intelligence beyond such as my cavalry patrols brought in, and from which I knew that the enemy's advanced post was at
Sungboor, twelve miles in my front, on the Kushk- i- Nakhud road, I considered it advisable to await events in the position I had taken up at the latter place.
On learning, however, that the enemy was making for
Maiwand, I determined to move on that place at once.
The force marched at 6.30 a.m. on the 27th July, encumbered by an enormous quantity of ordnance and commissariat stores and baggage. This was unavoidable, as the hostile state of the country rendered it impossible to leave anything behind in safety, and I could not divide my already too weak force.
After proceeding about eight miles, large masses of troops were discovered, about four miles distant, moving in a diagonal direction across our right front, and it was evident that a collision with Ayub Khan's army must take place before we reached our destination.
Advancing on a village which lay about a mile in my front, I placed my baggage there, and on the higher ground beyond I deployed my infantry into line with guns in the
centre, and the cavalry on the left, covering the movement with two horse artillery guns and a troop of cavalry.
It was difficult, on account of the haze and dust, to estimate the number of the enemy, but judging by the extent of country covered, I believe I am within the mark when I set down his strength at 25,000 men.
At 11.45 a.m. the fight commenced by the advanced guns under Lieutenant H Maclaine coming into action on our left, followed shortly by two horse artillery guns and the smooth-bore battery in our
centre. The remaining two 9-ponders were also brought up from the rearguard.
In about half an hour the enemy began to reply from their right, gradually extending along their front, and concentrating their fire of thirty guns on our position.
The infantry were ordered to lie down, and the wing of Jacob's Rifles, which had been in reserve, was brought up on the flanks, which were threatened on the right by ghazis, and on the left by the enemy's regular cavalry.
In this position we remained for nearly three hours, our artillery making excellent practice, the cavalry holding the enemy's cavalry in check, and the infantry keeping up a steady fire on the ghazis on our right.
A large body of the enemy's regular infantry were on our left front, and about the middle of the day they advanced in line, but well-delivered volleys checked them, and they did not come on again.
Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the fire of the enemy's guns slackened, and swarms of ghazis advanced rapidly towards our
centre.
Up to this time the casualties amongst the infantry had not been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily and the guns were sweeping the ground with case-shot, I felt confident as to the result.
But our fire failed to check the ghazis; they came on in overwhelming numbers, and making good their rush, they seized the two most advanced horse artillery guns.
With the exception of two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops had been splendid up to this point; but now at a critical moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the infantry gave way, and commencing from the left, rolled up like a wave to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I went for the cavalry. (I was obliged to go myself, having no staff officer left.)
The 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Sind Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to charge across the front and to give the infantry an opportunity of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my order.
All was now over, and I returned to the infantry to do what might be done to save them from complete annihilation.
After retreating across the nullah,and through the gardens near the village, a small walled enclosure was reached, and in this about 150 men of different corps, with several officers, made a stand and checked the enemy for a time; but seeing that we were rapidly being outflanked, and that our line of retreat would presently be cut off, I gave the order to retire.
A wide open plain lay before us, and with discipline utterly gone and the men all scattered the prospect was discouraging; but we succeeded in making our way without much loss for a distance of three miles, when we joined the guns and cavalry in rear of the baggage, which was by this time stretching for miles over the country towards
Kandahar.
Small parties of the enemy continued to hover in our rear, but no vigorous pursuit was made.
After daylight we were fired on from every village we passed, until we reached
Kokeran, when we met a small force under General Brooke, which cleared the way for us into
Kandahar.
Of the four horse artillery 9-pounder guns and six smooth bore guns with which we left the field, the whole of the former and one of the latter were brought safely into
Kandahar; the five other smooth-bore guns had, one by one, to be abandoned during the retreat, the horses being unable to bring them on.
Of the conduct of the troops, generally, I have already spoken, but I wish to bring the artillery to special notice; their behaviour was admirable; exposed to a heavy fire they served their guns coolly and steadily as on parade, and when the guns were rushed, they fought the ghazis with handspikes, sponge-rods etc..
In explanation of the unfortunate loss of the two horse artillery guns, the officer commanding the battery has reported that Lieutenant
Maclaine, who was in charge of them, waited to fire another round of case after the order to limber up and retire had been given, and the delay was fatal.
AFTERMATH
THE REFIGHT
The first time the battle was fought as a demonstration game was at the Midland
Militaire. The game went much as the original battle. The Afghans made a very slow start, choosing to fire the artillery at long range while the ghazis moved
south to use the Mundabad Ravine as cover to outflank the British right. Both they and the Regulars were slowed by the ravine and the nullahs as these were not counted as home terrain. The British had some success in the artillery duel, forcing some of the Afghan batteries to retire but overall the small casualties inflicted by the artillery on both sides were more galling to the British. In particular the Bombay Grenadiers were suffering but still managed to withstand two charges. On the left flank the cavalry withstood the repeated attacks of the Afghan horse but eventually numbers told and they were forced to flee. This left the Bombay Grenadiers exposed and despite valiant efforts, a three pronged attack was too much for them. The attack by the Regular Afghans faltered but just managed to make the British lines. The final nail in the coffin occurred when the ghazis left the ravine and crashed into the right flank. At that point the British conceded.
Overall we were pleased with the
course of the game. Several new players found the rules simple to pick up (and
even pointed out factors that I forgot later !). We were also very pleased to be
awarded the trophy for best demonstration game.
FIGURE AVAILABILITY
In 25mm the British and Indian Infantry and cavalry are available from Redoubt,
Wargames Foundry and Hinchliffe. Whilst the infantry are not exactly correct
they are very close. The horse artillery, which inspired many an illustration,
are available from Wargames Foundry.
The Afghans are also available from Wargames Foundry, although irregular figures
from various manufacturers were included to add variety.
In 15mm there are several ranges available from Minifigs, Essex, Irregular and I
am sure there are others. Irregular are the only firm who make the Afghan
regulars.
SOURCES
London Gazette November 1880.
Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80, S.H.Shadbolt.
Army Lists
British
Afgan
List 1
Afgan List 2
