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BackgroundThis battle was the subject of an excellent article by Stephen Maughan in Practical Wargamer in November/December 1994. The battle took place on 5th November 1883 on the wooded plain of Sheikan and Lietenant-General William ‘Billy’ Hicks together with 8000 Egyptian regulars, 1000 bashi-bazouks, 100 tribal irregulars, 2000 camp followers and 5000 camels were all but annihilated. The Kordofan expedition, as the force was known, set out from Khartoum to El Obeid, the last known whereabouts of the Mahdi. They chose, or possibly were persuaded by guides in the pay of the Mahdi, to go the long route and suffered in the intense heat. They carried with them enough supplies for 50 days, hence the vast amount of baggage. This report comes from the London Illustrated News of 1883 and is neccessarily brief as at this time I do not think any European survivors had been found. I have therefore included extra details to give some background to the conflict. Lietenant-General William ‘Billy’ Hicks ‘The origin and progress of the insurrection, which is guided by Arabs and other men of superior race, but which prevails among the native populations of that part of Africa, ought to be more correctly known. It is due to several combined causes; discontent with the corrupt and oppressive rule of Egypt; the intrigues of Arab slavedealers and their customers among the native chiefs, who wish to carry on their inhuman traffic without interference; but, more than all, a mighty impulse of religious fanaticism, which has been seething in the minds of African Moslems during several years past. There is, extending half across that Continent from the confines of Tunis and Tripoli to the Red Sea, a powerful association of Mohammedans, called the ‘Senoussia’, with enroled members in every tribe, and with special establishments for the residence of those set apart to conduct the work. Its object is to revive the glory of Islam, to deliver the nations believing in the Prophet from the control of the European Powers, and to overthrow such Mussulman Princes as the Khedive and the Sultan of Turkey, because they are held to have forfeited their trust in accepting some degree of foreign supervision. A legendary prophecy was current which foretold that, at a certain date, reckoned from the time of Mohammed, an inspired Guide or ‘Mahdi’ would appear, who should call the Moslem populations to arms, and who would be victorious over all foes of their faith. The person who came forward, about two years ago, claiming himself to be this Mahdi, has long been well known in the Soudan as a religious enthusiast of the recognised class of Dervishes, and has resided in several chief towns of different provinces. He is a native of Dongola, named Mohammed Ahmed, the son of a carpenter, apprenticed to his uncle, a tanner, at Sennaar, but afterwards trained as a Dervish in the most noted schools of that order at Khartoum and at Berber, whence he came, in 1870, to Kana, on the White Nile, for his complete initiation by the eminent preceptor Noureddin. He lived for a time as a devout hermit in a grotto on an islet of the Nile at Kana. Having attracted many disciples, he returned to this home, and set up a dervish school of his own. He married four wives, as is allowed by the Mohammedan religion, and seemed to have settled in life at Dongola, until, in May 1881 he suddenly announced that he had, through faith in the Prophet of Mecca, received a supernatural revelation, and that he was to be the conquering Reformer of Islam. The Governor of the Soudan, then Reouf Pasha, hearing of this, gave orders for the arrest of Mohammed Ahmed; but he escaped to Kordofan, and raised general revolt in that province and in Darfur, which lies west of Kordofan. Shortly before the Egyptian troubles of last year, a force of 3000 men was sent against the Mahdi, but could not overtake him; and he has continued to grow stronger from month to month. The great Mohammedan theological University at Cairo, called El Azhar, at the request of the Khedive, has declared this ‘false Mahdi’ to be a liar, who shall be punished with eternal fire; but it does not prevent his leading an army of more than two hundred thousand warriors to destroy the Egyptian rule in the Soudan. The expedition was sent by the Khedive’s government, at the beginning of this year, against the advice of the British government; but Major General Hicks and other retired officers of the British army were committed to take service in this campaign. Hicks Pasha met and defeated portions ofthe Mahdi’s forces on April 29th, near the fort of Kawa, on the Nile, and again some weeks later; but the insurgents still gathered strength in Kordofan, and about two months ago Hicks Pasha set out with his army on a march of two hundred miles, leaving the Nile at Duem, to attempt the capture of El Obeid. On November 3rd, as we know learn, the Egyptian army, having been led astray by a treacherous guide, was attacked by the Mahdi’s immense host, and, forming square, stood on the defensive all that day and two succeeding days. About one third of the Egyptian troops at length surrendered to the Mahdi and were spared; the rest had been slain with Hicks Pasha and the other officers. Two or three of the European non-combatants are said to have been made prisoners and taken to Obeid. Major General W Hicks (Hicks Pasha) entered the Bombay army as far back as 1849. He served in Bengal during the campaign of 1857-59 with the First Belooch Battalion, and as Staff Officer to the Punjaub Moveable Column; served in the Rohileund campaign with Major General Penny’s forces, and was present in the action of Kukralee, action with Feroze Shah’s force before Bareilly and occupation of that town; actions of Bunnee, Mahomdee and attacks by the rebels on Shahjehaupore; campaign for the subjugation of Oude, and present at the attack on and capture of the Fort of Rampore Kussia, surrender and occupation of the Fort of Amethee; subsequently, with Lord Clyde’s force at the occupation of Sunkerpore, attack and defeat of the enemy under Beni Madho at Dhoondia Keria, and capture of the Fort of Buxar; with the column detached after the action to drive the enemy across the river Goomtee. Served under Lord Clyde throughout the operations across the Gogra; present at the action with the Nana’s force at Brijidia, action at Churdah, attack on and capture of the Fort of Mujeediah; commanded the right wing of the First Belooch Battalion detached with Brigadier Horsford’s brigade previously to and on the passage of the Raptee into Nepaul; at the defeat of the enemy at Sitk Ghaut, and capture of their guns (mentioned in despatches, medal); served as Brigade Major, second brigade, first division, during the Abyssinian campaign in 1867-8 and was present at the capture of Magdala (mentioned in despatches, brevet major, and medal). Some months ago Colonel Hicks went to Egypt and after taking up the office of Chief of the Staff, he was appointed by the Khedive Commander-in-Chief of the Soudan army. He was married in 1854 to Sophia, youngest daughter of the late Mr W F Dixon of Page Hall, Sheffield. This lady, with her children, resides at Brighton. The English officers attached to the expedition with Major-General Hicks were Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. J Colborne, late major of the 11th foot; Lieutenant-Colonel Coetlogou, late major of the 70th foot; Major Martin, late Captain of Baker’s Horse in South Africa; Major Farquhar, late Captain of the Grenadier Guards; Captain Forestier Walker, late Lieutenant of the Buffs or East Kent Regiment; Captain Massey late Lieutenant of the Duke of Cambridge’s Own (Middlesex Regiment); Surgeon Major Rosenberg, Major Warner, Captain W Page Phillips and Mr E B Evans, Intelligence Department. The cavalry was under the command of Major Martin; the artillery, with Nordenfeldt guns, was under the command of Captain Forestier Walker. Colonel the Hon. J Colborne was, according to the last advices, on sick leave at Cairo. The gentleman who acted as Mr Broadley’s interpreter during the state trials at Cairo, Mr Edward Baldwin Evans, went to the Soudan, it is stated, in a similar capacity under Hicks Pasha. Mr Evans did good service with the Indian contingent and was at Tel-el-Kabir. Mr O’Donovan the special correspondent of the Daily News, also accompanied the expedition. Two German officers, of whom one was Major Seckendorf, were there as spectators of the campaign. It is understood that the British political and military advisers of the Khedive have warned him not to think of attempting the reconquest of the Soudan; but every effort will at once be made to rescue the troops and officers left at Khartoum and at Sennaar; for which purposes Baker Pasha (formerly Colonel Valentine Baker) will take two thousand gendarmes to occupy Souakim and keep open the road from Berber. Six hundred have already started. For the defence of upper Egypt, all the troops available will be sent to Assouan, and will hold fortified positions in the Valleyof the Nile. The coquette gun-boat, and probably other British vessels of war are to be sent to Souakim, which is a port of considerable traffic, and is the residence of several European merchants.’ Stephen Maughan is highly critical of the ineptitude shown by all the commanders, giving many examples of drunkenness and downright incompetence but it is difficult to doubt Hicks’ courage after such a glowing testimonial. It is more likely that the disaster was down to bad planning and the low morale of the Egyptian troops as they were very newly raised and trained. The game can be run in two ways, the first is by far the easiest to set up and run (it could probably be run as a solo game) with the infantry deployed in squares ready to meet the onslaught of the Mahdi’s forces. The entire table should be covered with mimosa scrub and rocky ground which is home terrain to the natives. This means there is little chance of the Egyptian forces spotting the enemy before they are ready to charge and there is certainly no chance of any significant long range fire. I am not sure how best to represent the terrain as rolling for each 12" x 6" seems a little tedious. It is probaly best to roll for every two pieces as one, or alternatively roll for all the scrub and all the rocky ground. The second game could consist of the Egyptians advancing across the table attempting to reach a well or oasis at the other end of the table (or just off it). The army should deploy on one of the short sides of the table while the Mahdi can deploy his forces on any of the other sides. This is much the harder option for the Egyptian player as he has to take into account the poor command control of his commanders when deploying to meet an attack, rather than already being deployed in square. To make up for this it is probably best to award him a victory if he can reach the well/oasis with say half his troops (although no doubt their victory would be short-lived !) The positions shown in the map are those given by Stephen but the Mahdist player can position units anywhere on the edge of the table. THE REFIGHTI felt that a little deception was called for and gave the Egyptians to an experienced player. The Mahdists were taken by someone who had only played one game and I thought this might make him wary of taking on regular troops frontally. This is probably not historical as the Mahdi gave several warnings of the impending doom of the column, either because he knew of the lack of training, or possibly this was just propaganda. The Egyptian player decided to set up in one large square which probably meant I had allowed him too much clear ground in the centre of the table. We even threw in a couple of units in khaki to make it appear that the Mahdists were facing a strong regular force. The Mahdist player advanced cautiously using as much cover as possible. He was rather surprised by the lack of firepower against him. His first skirmish fire caused a casualty on the bashi bazouks who rolled an eight and seemed happy. Unfortunately it was pointed out that they should only have rolled a D6 and the reroll was a 1. They promptly routed and left a hole in the square. The massed foot then started forward and were momentarily held after some poor rolls. However the initiative for the next turn was enough to remove the shaken markers and take them into contact. The Egyptian fire was not enough to stop them and it turned into a massacre. By this time one side of the square had formed a firing line but it was obvious that this would be overwhelmed. Many thanks to Richard Walker (Egyptians) and Steven Gray (Mahdists) for being the guinea pigs. THE ARMY LISTSYou will see that the Egyptians have poor fire discipline and are hampered by a large baggage train. The irregular cavalry under Major Martin have been ignored as there was only 100 of them and they seemed to play no part in the battle. I feel that the Mahdist foot should probably be steadfast at this stage as they were still full of religious fervour and confident that they could defeat the enemy. As usual permission is given to photocopy these for your own use. |
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