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John Bailey Reproduced With Permission from Principles of War The Magazine August 2001, Issue 10 Having recently acquired a second-hand Boer army, and building a British army to fight it, I read the article by Jeremy Howison-Howarth and Christopher Ash in issue six, and found it interesting and useful. I have myself done some research into the war and would like to offer my own observations. [1] Troops. At the time the British Empire was at its peak, and though they had a shaky start, did show tenacity and ability to adapt, and improve. However, it was unaccustomed to fighting a guerrilla war with any enemy well used to ‘modern’ technology, as well as being highly motivated and ably lead by commanders such as De Witt and Botha. The British were not totally devoid of competent generals, for example Major-General Ian Hamilton, who was a veteran of Majuba in the First Anglo-Boer War and was well aware of the Boer tactics and used loose order tactics. Officers like French and Haige, who realised that the horse was the key, and Kitchener’s use of railways and blockhouses and controversially the ‘concentration’ camps (a humanitarian exercise gone wrong) first used by Lord Roberts brought the war finally to its conclusion. Suggestion – to reflect the varying quality of command use this officer ability chart. Roll 1D6 1 Poor quality officer who is ‘Hidebound’ in his attitude, troops in his tender care may not operate in loose order or lie down, unless force to. 2 Poor quality officer who can operate with some flexibility. 3/4 Average quality officers who can operate with flexibility. 5 Good quality officer who is ‘Hidebound’, who is experienced at fighting Fuzzy-Wuzzys and the like, ‘and all colonials are alike ain’t they?’ 6 Good quality officer who can operate with some flexibility.
[2] Terrain. The veldt is a difficult area in more ways than one. Firstly the ground may be rugged, but it affords very little in cover except for the kopi or hills that are formidable. Also this terrain is affected by the weather. I will come to that later. Observation was also difficult, due in part to the weather, but also undulations in the ground.
Suggestion – to reflect the terrain, use these terrain and observation amendments.
[3] Weather. It is a well known fact that the most ignored reality of warfare is the weather. Many battles have been won or lost because of the intervention of the meteorological spanner in the works. The 2nd Boer War has some graphic examples of mother nature’s intervention, for example at Elandslaagte on 21st October 1899, when a ferocious and sudden thunderstorm saved the British Army from another ‘drubbing’ and made them turn the tables on the Boers. The weather in South Africa can be brutally hot during the day and freezing cold that same night, no rain for weeks on end, then rain persistently for up to a week, according to the accounts of the soldiers involved (see bibliography). Suggestion – to take into account the weather, dice on a D6, for the conditions; I would then suggest a climbing scale and effects of such. 6 Weather is ‘hospitable’ and no extreme effects take place. 5 Weather is hot, and not likely to change. British forces lose 4D.6 strength points at the beginning of the game due to heat exhaustion. 4 Weather is hospitable but is likely to change. Roll D6 every 4 moves. If a 6 is rolled the weather begins to warm up, and 2D6 losses are incurred by British Troops. 3 Weather is ‘hospitable’ and no extreme effects take place. 2 Weather is hospitable but is likely to change. Roll D.6 every 4 moves. If a is folled a thunderstorm starts. All movement is reduced by one level. E.g. Speed 1 becomes Speed 2, with the exception of artillery, and wagons, which become immobilised. 1 It’s raining heavily and all movement is reduced by one level. E.g. Speed 1 becomes Speed 2, with the exception of artillery and wagons, which become immobilised. [4] Firepower. This is the most important factor. In my opinion this could be arguably the first modern war in many ways. The American Civil War may have had trenches but not backed-up with machine guns and ‘quick-firing’ artillery. There are many examples of the effect of firepower throughout the war, a graphic example of this is in the battle of Margersfontein on 11th December 1899, where over 1,000 British soldiers were killed and wounded compared to 250 Boers. It is most remembered for the bitterness of the Highland Brigade which was immortalised in an anonymous poem from which I quote: “Whey weren’t we told of the trenches? Whey weren’t we told of the wise? Why were we marched up in column? May Tommy Atkins enquire?” Suggestion – to reflect the intensity of firepower and its effects on the poor sods who can be caught up in it, I suggest that you can ‘pindown’ units with this simple formula. To pin a target, you must have 4 times advantage and have caused a casualty and they have become shaken or retire shaken. The result of this means the effected unit/s may not move or fire, assumed to have gone prone, therefore is ‘hidden’ and has a column to the left for cover. In addition to this, it requires 2 initiative points to undo pinned effect and remove the shaken effect, and the unit has a -2 on its morale. I hope you find any of my suggestions useful. They may look as though they are weighted against the British, but they do (in my opinion) reflect the hardships ‘Tommy Atkins’ had to endure and a grim portent as to future conflicts. Notes: as a matter of interest, my home town of Darlington has an excellent 2nd Boear War memorial showing Tommy Atkins charging in his Ors service helmet but very little kit. This is situated in the grounds of St Cuthbert’s church. BIBLIOGRAPHY:Field Marshall Lord Carver. The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War. Men At Arms – Osprey. Boer Wars [2] 1898 – 1902 – Ian Knight & Gerry Embleton. The Colonial Source Book – Philip J. Haythornthwaite. Wargaming in History – The Second Anglo-Boer War – Edwin Herbert. Channel 4 Books – The Boer War – Tabitha Jackson Various Wargames magazines and Jeremy Howison-Howarth & Christopher Ash’s article. | |||||||||||||||||||
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