The main Transvaal army including the State Artillery and Hollander, German and Irish volunteer corps, was concentrated near the Natal frontier under Piet Joubert who threw forwards two wings. The first commando (about 4,000 strong) under General Erasmus moved towards Dundee from the north, establishing contact with General Meyer who was closing from the east (with about 3,000 men). The other wing under General Kock (with 1,000 men and three guns) moved on Ladysmith from the north, while the Free Staters (under the O.F.S. Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo) approached Ladysmith from the west.

Sir George White’s (1) orders was to defend Natal, and to do that he concentrated at Ladysmith, an important railway junction and Natal’s chief military centre. He also realised that General Penn Symons with 4,500 men had moved to Dundee, 45 miles northeast of Ladysmith, leaving a dangerous gap between the two forces.

White felt uneasy about this division, and only by combining his forces could he hope to meet the Boers on an equal footing. He therefore ordered Symons to pull back and join him at Ladysmith.

Unfortunately Meyer’s commando attacked Symons before he could react to this order.

On the 22^nd Symons received orders to retreat to Ladysmith.

Dundee was a small coal-mining village, surrounded by low hills, except for the flat top hill Impati, which reared up for 1,500 feet on the north side of the town, dominating the valley and containing the town’s water supply. Dundee also contained the station for the branch line from the Durban-Pretoria railway.

Although Dundee had been ‘saved’ the day before at the battle of Talena, (20^th October 1899) by Symons, and his second in command (and successor), General Yule. The Boers still remained in position of Impati and the town’s water supply, and were in a position to attack again at any point. This also prevented any direct escape to Ladysmith for Symons.

On the 19^th October an advance guard of General Kock’s Johannesburg commando ( Led by Ben Viljoen, of 1,000 men which included two hundred of the detested Hollanders and Germans, two guns and a Maxim), had ridden south, by-passing Symons’s garrison at Dundee, and captured a supply train at Elandslaagte station, only ten miles north-east of Ladysmith. It only consisted of a railway station and hotel, a few buildings and mine shafts. But possession of it completely cut rail, telegraphic and direct road communication between Dundee and Ladysmith.

On the left is a photo of General de Kock and his staff. This was sent to me by one of his decedents, Helgard van Antwerp [hvanantwerp @ dsl.pipex.com]. Click on the image for full size.

John Denton Pinkstone French (2) arrived at Ladysmith the same day as the battle of Talena, promptly capturing a Boer patrol who, probably unaware of Kock’s arrival, led General White to believe that the restoration of communications with Dundee would be simple. White ordered French to recapture Elandslaagte at dawn. He took with him at first, the 5^th Lancers, some Natal Carbineers, and Border mounted rifles as cavalry; some of the 2^nd Gordens, the 1^st Devons, and the 1^st Manchesters by way of infantry. There was also the 42^nd and 21^st Natal Field Batteries of artillery. After about four miles the infantry and artillery were left behind and the general pushed on with his cavalry

On the dawn of the 21^st, the Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Artillery battery, and fifty men of the Manchester regiment attacked Elandslaagte, and, achieving complete surprise, turned Kock’s men out of the station, but coming under heavy Boer artillery fire from the hill Impati. French was forced to withdraw out of range and await reinforcements.

White (In response from a telephone message from French asking for ‘substantial reinforcements of infantry’, quickly sent 3,000 infantry up from Durban in two armoured trains, Ian Hamilton with seven companies of the 1st Devon’s, four companies of the 1^st Manchester’s and five companies of the 2^nd Gordon Highlanders, followed along the road by a squadron each of the 5^th Dragoon guards and 5^th Lancers. Five squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse, rode along to keep pace with the train. Two field batteries (Twelve 15pdrs) galloped out from Ladysmith with double teams of horses.

Detraining his men behind the western arm, Hamilton explained his plan: while seven companies of the Devon’s attacked frontally across the 2-mile dip between the arms, directly across the inside of the horseshoe. The four companies of the Manchester’s, five of the Gordens and the dismounted ILH were to work their way round the toe of the horseshoe shaped ridge of high ground south of Elandslaagte, and roll up the entrenched Boer left flank from the south, while the cavalry were to follow the railway, ready to cut in behind the enemy.

French also believed in the cavalry textbook. He had no intention of letting loose the cavalry till after the infantry had succeeded. By contrast Hamilton had doubts about conventional infantry tactics for use against the magazine rifle. He had noticed the success in Northwest India of a few Afridi tribesmen, armed with stolen British rifles, against British troops in the conventional shoulder-to-shoulder formation.

Hamilton now told his infantry colonels to keep exceptionally open order with three yards between each man in line, and 450 yards between each successive line – a much greater dispersion than anything practised at Aldershot. Excitedly the men, mostly experienced soldiers from India, cheered Hamilton, shouting ‘ We’ll do it! we’ll do it sir!’

The afternoon drew on, and black clouds of a thunderstorm were massed over the Boer positions. After half-an-hour’s bombardment, the Devon’s, with three companies in line forward, went over the western arm and advanced steadily across the flat in short bounds, pausing to fire volleys. Their extended formation paid dividends against the Boer gunfire and their khaki blended with the veldt and made poor aiming marks for the enemy riflemen. The nearer they got, however, the heavier the fire, until they were forced to take cover while their supporting batteries re-opened fire and the flank attack developed. The Manchester’s had been circling the toe but came under murderous fire as it approached the Boer left flank. The Manchester’s went to ground. The Gordon’s, led by Colonel Dick-Cunyngham, suffered severely in their conspicuous kilts as they were halted by some wire fences. At that moment the thunderstorm broke over the battlefield, enabling the advance to be resumed. Hamilton rode up to order the charge, the bugles sounded and the bayonets swept forward to the objective. Most of the Boers fled and a white flag went up. Hamilton ordered ‘Cease Fire’. As the soaked, victorious infantry rested, a hidden group of Boers rushed forward firing. Caught unawares, the infantry recoiled. But Hamilton again was there to rally the men, calling for the pipes and bugles to sound once more. The infantry recovered and charged home.

By now the Devon’s had also crested the ridge and all over the captured position men lifted their helmets on their upheld rifles, shouting ‘Majuba, Majuba!’ .The infantry had triumphed…now for the cavalry charge.

The surviving Boers reached their horses and made off northeast to escape in the gathering darkness. Suddenly, from their left, one squadron each of the 5^th Dragoon guards and 5^th Lancers crashed into them. For a mile and a half the cavalry rode through them, rallied and rode through them again until it was dark. About half of Kock’s commando were now causalities, and Kock himself was mortally wounded.

At this point Sir George received a messenger with a dispatch from Ladysmith saying that the Free Staters (Who he believed were about 10,000 strong) were about to pounce on the town. He also believed that Joubert was approaching Elaandslaagte with the main Transvaal army. Neither was true, but on the strength of this information he decided to abandon Elandslaagte and ordered a hurried retreat to Ladysmith. Battle fatigue, mud, the darkness, the lack of preparation, and the fear of a Boer attack turned the retirement into a rout. Panic-stricken men abandoned valuable arms and equipment, and abandoned their prisoners. The Battle of Elandslaagte, so hardly won, was made a sheer waste of toil and life.

Three days later White fought an inconclusive battle at Rietfontein to protect the flank of Yule’s column returning from Dundee, which reached Ladysmith on the 26^th hungry and demoralised.

At Dundee, Penn Symons died from a bullet wound in his stomach, without ever knowing if his men were safe.

On the same day the Boer forces of about 24,000 were able to combine and begin to surround White’s forces of 13,000 men crammed into Ladysmith.

This is an interesting battle, demonstrating the effectiveness of open order tactics. Despite the overwhelming British numbers the Boers could have won the battle should it not have been for the weather, and the effective leadership of Hamilton. This battle also reflects experienced troops transferred from India.

On the war games table, a random weather effect could be introduced, increasing with each turn.

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